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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. When the parti es to an action submit tl le natter for 
decision on stipulated facts/ is it error for the trial court to 
enter judgment without setting forth the conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds for the judgment? 
2. When the parties to an action submit the matter for 
decision oi :i st i p\ i] a t e d f a c t s / and 11 ie j u d g e t ::> \ /1 I• :: i act i oi i is 
assigned retires from the bench after entering a minute order 
stating, " . . . comes now the court & orders that judgment t-
granted to plaintiff"/ is it error for 11: ie successor :-'•-•-
enter judgment based on the minute order without examining the 
stir ited facts or setting forth the conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds for the judgment? 
3. When the parties to an action submit the matter for 
decision : i I s t i p i I 1 a t e d f a c t s / a n d judge -\- -^tion is 
assigned retires from the bench after hearing arguments but 
before entering judgment, is it error for the successor judge to 
award attorney fees when the stipulated facts coiitain no stipula-
tion concerning attorney fs fees? 
4. Can a condominium owners' association become 
obligated on a contract entered between a vendor and the 
promoter-builder-developer of the condominium building when 
(a ) 11 i e o vi i I e r s ' a s s o c i a t :i o i I w a s i; :t :> t f o i: in e d u i 11 :i I after 
the contract was cancelled, 
(b) the condominium unit owners were not aware of the 
con 1: t: a c t \ :i i: I t i 1 s u e d f o r \ \\v 11. * 1 u u t»,. «J11 H I I i i e i flu1 i" M j 11, r a c t , 
i 
(c) no evidence exists that the unit owners who 
comprised the membership of the owners' association, except the 
promoter-builder-developer/ realized any benefits from the 
contract / 
(d) no evidence exists that at time of contracting the 
vendor intended the then nonexistent owners' association to 
become liable on the contract/ 
(e) no evidence exists that at time of contracting the 
builder-developer-promoter intended to enter the contract in the 
capacity of director of the then nonexistent owners' association/ 
and/ 
(f) no evidence exists that the builder-promoter-
developer complied with constraints on its contracting power 
contained in the condominium declaration and bylaws? 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Dover Elevator brought suit against a 
|i: » artnershi p ai i < 3 i ts general p a rtners for the balance due on an 
elevator construction contract constructed at a condominium 
building and for the balance due on an elevator maintenance 
agreement" Tl'u.1 partnership was I \n- ^Oiidomi n 1 urn developer Dover 
joined the condominium owners 1 association/ alleging that it was 
jointly liable on the maintenance agreement. The case was argued 
on a set of stipulated facts numbered .1 through 25. 175-232) 
The relevant stipulated facts are paraphrased below. The stip-
ulated facts not included in the following list u- stipulated 
facts are indicated by number followed by the word "omitted"/ 
enclosed in brackets thusly: [omitted]. 
1. During late 1979 or early 1980, Hill-Mangum 
Investment Company (hereinafter/ Hill-Mangum), a partnership 
consisting of Brent C. Hill and Russell W Mangum, began 
construction a multi-story condominium known as Garden Towers. 
(R. 175-176) 
2. On or about August 27/ 1980/ prior to adoption of 
Covenants/ Conditions and Restrictions/ an elevator construction 
contract was entered between Hill-Mangum as purchaser and Dover 
Elevator as seller. The contract was signed by Gary Lawrence/ 
Hill-Mangum 1s project manager (^ i< 186) 
3.-4 [omitted]. 
b . C o i i d o in. i i i :i I i in C o v e n a i i1 s / C o n d i t i o it i s
 f a n d R e s 11: :i c t ions 
were signed by the Declarant/ Hill-Mangum/ on August 12, 1981. 
(R. 176; 233-265) 
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6. On March 1, 1982, a further agreement dealing with 
maintenance of the elevator (the Maintenance Agreement) to be 
installed at Garden Towers was entered between Gary Lawrence on 
behalf of Hill-Mangum and Dover Elevator. (R. 176-177; 196-199) 
7. [omitted]. 
8.-9. Hill-Mangum was unable to complete construction 
of Garden Towers (R. 177), and abandoned the project. Less than 
50% of the units in the building were sold, and many units are 
uncompleted. Hill-Mangum holds title to 18 of the units. Four 
units have been foreclosed upon. There are approximately 12 
units owned by individuals other than Hill-Mangum,. (R. 177) 
10. Dover Elevator maintained the elevators in the 
building from March 1, 1982, through January 23, 1984, when the 
Maintenance Agreement was cancelled due to non-payment. (R. 177) 
11.-13. [omitted]. 
14. Several payments on the Maintenance Agreement were 
made by check written on an account bearing the name "Garden 
Towers Condominium Owners Association". (R. 179; 204-208) 
15.-16. [omitted]. 
17. On or about January 27, 1984, Hill-Mangum entered 
into an agreement with Wasatch Elevator for the maintenance of 
the elevators at Garden Towers. This contract states that 
"Garden Towers Condo Assoc." is the "purchaser", and is signed on 
behalf of the "purchaser" by Ned R. Fox who was employed by 
Hill-Mangum for the purpose of selling Hil1-Mangum1s remaining 
unsold units. (R. 179; 211-218) 
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18. In December of 1983, Hill-Mangum contacted the 
Garden Towers unit owners and suggested that they hold an owners1 
meet i i i g i i J a i i u a i: y o f 1 9 8 4 t o e J e c t o f f i c e r s a i: i d t a k e o v e r • 
operation of the condominium owners1 association. Until then, 
there had been no meetings between Hill-Mangum and the individual 
unit owners nor any meeting of the owners1 association. (R. 179-
180) 
December , 1983 / the i n i. i t • : >wi lers wrote back to 
Hill-Mangum/ declining to accept "control and management" of the 
project until a number of enumerated items had been completed and 
an accoui It: i ng pr ovided . ( R ] 80 ; 219-220) 
20. [omitted]. 
21. Subsequently, the electric power to the building 
was terminated and the unit owners determined that they would 
have to assume the responsibility of keeping the building 
operative. (R. 180) 
22. On September 1, 1984/ the unat owners met to form 
a corporation to manage the building, A nonprofit corporation 
was formed ki iowi: i as "Garden Towers Condo-0wi: iers Corporation" . 
Officers and directors were elected and the corporation undertook 
the active management of the common areas of the building. (R. 
180) 
23. [omitted]. 
i or about October 15/ 1984/ Garden Towers Condo-
0wi Iers Corpora i 11erecii :i i: 11o a i :iew maintenance contract with 
Wasatch Elevator, replacing the earlier contract signed by Ned 
Fox. (R. JLBI) 
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25. The officers of Garden Towers Condo-Owners 
Corporation were not aware/ until served with Dover Elevator's 
Complaint/ of the Maintenance Agreement with Dovec Elevator which 
predated the maintenance contract with Wasatch Elevator that was 
in place wnen the corporation w*s formed. (R. 181) 
Following oc-..l cijgument/ Th2 Honorable Philip R. 
Fidh-isr took the matted u.i^^^ *~visement. Oa July 3 1/ 1986/ 
shortly before retiring from the bench/ Judge Fishier signed a 
minute order which stated/ "The court having heretofore taken 
this matter under advisement/ comes now the court & orders that 
judgment be granted to plaintiff". (R. 266) Thereafter/ 
plaintiff submitted proposed findings of fact (incorporating the 
stipulated facts) and conclusions of law. (R. 394-398) Defendant 
Garden Towers Condo-Owners Corporation objected to the proposed 
findings and conclusions. By unsigned minute order dated October 
27, 1986/ defendant's objections were denied. (R. 383) Neverthe-
less/ Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were never entered. 
Judgment was entered against Garden Towers Condo-Owners 
Corporation on December 16/ 1986/ by The Honorable Michael R. 
Murphy. (R. 410-413) There is no indication in the record that 
Judge Murphy ever considered the merits of the case; instead/ he 
entered Judgment on the basis of Judge Fishierfs minute order. 
Garden Towers Condo-Owners Corporation filed its notice 
of appeal on January 6, 1987. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
After the parties agreed on a set of stipulated facts 
including documentary evidence (R. 175-232) and submitted written 
arguments/ Judge Philip Fishier entered a minute order (R. 266) 
stating simply that judgment should be granted for plaintiff 
Dover Elevator. Shortly thereafter/ Judge Fishier retired and 
was replaced on the bench by Judge Michael Murphy. Judge Murphy 
declined to reconsider the stipulated facts or written argument/ 
declined to reach conclusions of law based on the stipulated 
facts/ but did enter a judgment (R. 402) for plaintiff. 
Rule 52/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ provides that 
in all actions tried without a jury/ the court shall find the 
facts and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. It 
was reversable error in this case for Judge Murphy to enter 
judgment without reaching conclusions of law. It was also 
reversable error for the trial court to enter judgment without 
having reexamined the stipulated facts and legal arguments of 
counsel. Appellant had a fundamental right to a full hearing and 
an informed decision. Judge Murphy!s entry of judgment/ based 
solely on Judge Fishler's minute order/ without first becoming 
familiar with the facts and law, denied appellant that right. 
It was also reversable error for the trial court to 
enter judgment against appellant for attorney fees when the 
record contains no evidence as to the amount of attorney fees 
incurred by plaintiff in prosecuting its action against 
appellant/ and no findings of fact were made regarding a 
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reasonable attorney's fee. Freed Finance Company v. Stoker Motor 
Company/ 537 P.2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1975). 
Finally/ the judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed because the stipulated facts provided no basis upon 
which appellant could have become obligated on the Maintenance 
Agreement entered between Dover Elevator and Hill-Mangum. The 
stipulated facts are clear. Appellant/ the owners1 association 
eventually formed/ did not come into existence until after the 
Maintenance Agreement had been cancelled by plaintiff for 
nonpayment. Appellant did not even know of the Agreement until 
served with summons. There is no evidence from which the trial 
court could have concluded that any unit owner other than 
Hill-Mangum ever received any benefit from the services provided 
by plaintiff during the existence of the Agreement. 
While Hill-Mangum had the right pursuant to the Utah 
Condominium Act and the Garden Towers Declaration of Condominium 
to act as the Board of Directors of the owners association which 
was not yet formed/ the Agreement contains no indication that 
Hill-Mangum entered into it in any representative capacity. Even 
assuming the Agreement had implicated the then nonexistent 
owners1 association/ the law relating to the liability of a 
corporation for contracts entered by a promoter is analogous. A 
contract with a corporation's promoter is not one with the 
corporation. Absent ratification/ no liability will attach to a 
corporation for preincorporation contracts. Bishop v. Parker/ 
103 Utah 145/ 134 P. 180 (1943); Tanner v. Sinaloa Land & Fruit 
Co./ 43 Utah 14, 134 P. 586 (1913). 
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Even assuming an unexpressed intent on the part of 
Hill-Mangum to contract in the capacity of the then nonexistent 
owners' association's board of directors, Hill-Mangum failed to 
act in conformity with requirements of the Condominium 
Declaration and Bylaws prerequisite to contracting on behalf of 
the owners' association. There is no evidence that unit owner 
approval of the Maintenance Agreement was obtained, as required 
by paragraphs 11(a)(3) and 14 of the Declaration. There is no 
evidence of a Board resolution authorizing Hill-Mangum's project 
manager, Mike Lawrence, to enter a contract on behalf of the yet 
to-be-formed owners' association. 
Since there is no evidence Dover Elevator relied on th 
the credit of any entity other than Hill-Mangum when it agreed t 
provide services, a judgment in favor of Dover Elevator and 
against appellant is a pure windfall, not supported by statutory 
or case law. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
IT WAS REVERSABLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT 
WITHOUT SETTING FORTH THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WHICH 
CONSTITUTE THE GROUNDS FOR THE JUDGMENT 
Rule 52/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ provides 
generally that in all actions tried without a jury/ the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon. In the instant case the parties 
stipulated to the facts. After Judge Fishier ruled by minute 
order that judgment should be entered for plaintiff/ proposed 
findings of fact (incorporating by reference the stipulated 
facts) and conclusions of law were submitted to Judge Fishierfs 
successor/ Judge Murphy. Judge Murphy declined to sign the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 394-398) but instead 
entered judgment without setting forth conclusions of law. 
The failure to make findings of fact is reversible 
error and requires a remand. LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. 
Peterson/ 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615, 616 (1966); Kinkella v. 
Baugh/ 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983); Bastian v. King/ 661 P.2d 
953/ 957 (Utah 1983); Parks v. Zions First Nat. Bank/ 673 P.2d 
590, 601 (Utah 1983). So too is the failure to set forth the 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds for the judgment. 
The purpose of the rule requiring separately stated conclusions 
of law should apply just as firmly to a case, such as the instant 
one, where the facts are stipulated as to any other case tried to 
the court. The purpose of the rule is to require the trial judge 
to articulate his conclusions of law "so that he himself may be 
10 
satisfied that he has dealt fully and properly with all of the 
issues in the case before he decides it and so that the parties 
involved and the court on appeal may be fully informed as to the 
bases of his decision when it is made. 76 Am Jur 2d Trial § 
1258/ pp. 210-211. 
In the instant case/ it is not surprising that Judge 
Murphy declined to sign the conclusions of law submitted by 
counsel for Dover Elevator: to sign the conclusions of law 
submitted would have been to adopt those conclusions as his own 
and he was not familiar with the case/ having just taken the 
bench and having not heard the oral arguments made by counsel to 
Judge Fishier. As discussed in part II of this Argument/ if 
Judge Fishier was not available to reach conclusions of law and 
enter judgment/ Judge Murphy should have reexamined the 
stipulated facts and the law, then reached his own conclusions of 
law and entered judgment. 
Without conclusions of law appellant remains uninformed 
as to the bases of the decision against it and cannot be 
satisfied that the judgment was a reasoned one. The absence of 
conclusions of law also puts this court in an unsatisfactory 
position. Effective appellate review can only be had if the 
appellate court is provided the rationale of the trial court's 
judgment. The usual appellate review in a case tried without a 
jury on stipulated facts consists of a determination whether the 
stipulated facts supported the trial court's conclusions of law. 
Scharf v. BMG Corp./ 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985) ("We accord 
conclusions of law no particular deference/ but review them for 
11 
correctness.") In this case/ this court must actually make 
conclusions of law; that is/ unless the case is remanded for 
further argument and entry of conclusions of law by a trial judge 
who is in position to reach his own considered conclusions of 
law/ this court must perform the function of the trial court and 
reach its own conclusions of law based on the stipulated facts. 
The lack of conclusions of law has yet another effect 
on appellant and this court. Because the parties stipulated to 
the facts/ it is obvious that they could not agree on how the law 
should be applied to those facts. The absence of conclusions of 
law necessitates a shot-gun approach to arguing the merits of 
Dover Elevator's claim. Instead of on appeal attempting to point 
out why the trial court's conclusions are not justified by the 
agreed upon facts/ appellant is in the less enviable position of 
having to argue that under no circumstances do those facts 
warrant a judgment for plaintiff. For examples/ appellant 
alleged in its Amended Answer (R. 107-110) that Dover Elevator's 
cause of action against it was barred by the statute of 
limitations, either U.C.A. § 78-12-251 or § 78-12-26.2 In view 
of the fact that the contracts upon which Dover based its claims 
were entered between it and Hill-Mangum, appellant also alleged 
1. Four year limitation period for actions upon a contract/ 
obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in 
writing; also on an open account "for work/ labor or services 
rendered". 
2. Three years for "(3) an action for a liability created by 
the statutes of this state . . .." 
12 
3 
that the claims were barred by U.C.A. § 25-5-4(2). The failure 
to reach conclusions of law leaves appellant completely in the 
dark as to whether the trial court gave consideration to those 
affirmative defenses, and if it did why they were rejected, or 
whether the trial court just ignored the Statute of Limitations 
and Statute of Frauds issues raised by the Amended Answer. 
In LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson/ supra, 420 
P.2d 615, the court stated: 
"The right to resort to the courts for :he adjudication 
of grievances and the settlement of disputes is a 
fundamental and important one. An indispensable requisite 
to fulfilling that responsibility is the determination of 
questions of fact upon which there is disagreement. It is 
for this reason that our rules impose the duty of making 
findings on all material issues." 420 P.2d at 616. 
In this case there was no disagreement as to the 
pertinent facts but there was disagreement as to how the law 
applies to those facts. Judge Fishier shirked his responsibility 
when he left the bench without giving a basis for his ruling in 
favor of plaintiff. Judge Murphy then errored whan he entered 
judgment based, for all that appears in the record, solely on 
Judge Fishierfs minute entry and without reaching his own 
conclusions of law. 
3. That portion of the Statute of Frauds requiring "Every 
promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of 
another" to be in writing. 
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II. 
IT WAS REVERSABLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT 
WITHOUT REEXAMINING THE STIPULATED FACTS AND 
LEGAL ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL 
Just as it was error for the trial court to enter 
judgment without first setting forth conclusions of law/ so too 
was it reversable error for Judge Murphy to enter judgment 
without reexamining the stipulated facts and the trial memoranda 
of counsel and documentary evidence (R. 111-146; 156-163) before 
entering judgment. Because he was not familiar with the merits 
of the case/ Judge Murphy errored when he entered judgment for 
Dover based solely on Judge Fishier1s minute entry stating/ "The 
court having heretofore taken this matter under advisement/ comes 
now the court & orders that judgment be granted to plaintiff." 
(R. 266) That minute entry provided Judge Murphy with no 
indication that Judge Fishier had "dealt fully and properly with 
all of the issues in the case before he [decided] it". 76 Am Jur 
2d, supra, p. 210. 
If Judge Fishier was not available to make conclusions 
of law, Judge Murphy should have reexamined the stipulated facts, 
considered the written arguments of counsel, heard further oral 
argument if he felt it was necessary, and reached his own 
conclusions of law before entering judgment. In other words, he 
should have in effect conducted a new "trial". 
Appellant recognizes that judicial time is frequently 
at a premium. Appellant also recognizes that reargument in front 
of a different trial judge would have the effect of giving it a 
"second bite at the apple". However, the worthwhile goal of 
14 
preserving judicial economy must under these circumstances give 
way to the more fundamental judicial function of seeing that each 
party to an action receives a full hearing and an informed 
decision. 
A remand for the purpose of allowing the trial court to 
consider the stipulated facts and only then entering conclusions 
of law appropriate to those facts is the most judicious means of 
correcting the error. See, Silliman v. Powell/ 642 P.2d 388/ 392 
(Utah 1982). 
III. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY 
FEES WHEN THE STIPULATED FACTS CONTAINED NO EVIDENCE AS 
TO THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED 
In Utah/ attorney's fees are awardable only if provided 
for by statute or contract. Golden Key Realty/ Inc. v. Mantas, 
699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985).4 In the instant case the judgment (R. 
410-413) does award plaintiff attorney's fees of $1,444.68 in 
favor of Dover Elevator and against appellant Garden Towers 
Condo-Owners Corp./ based on a provision in the contract entered 
between Dover and Hill-Mangum. But the existance of a contract 
containing provision for recovery of attorney's fees does not/ 
ipso facto/ entitle a prevailing party in whose favor the 
contract provision runs to an award of attorney's fees. A trial 
court may "not award an attorney's fee without a stipulation as 
to the amount/ an unrebutted affidavit/ or evidence given as to 
4. This case does not involve a "writing executed after April 
28, 1986". Therefore, U.C.A. § 78-27-56.5 does not apply. 
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the value thereof". Freed Finance Company v. Stoker Motor 
Company/ 537 P.2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1975). 
Further factual background is necessary. At a pretrial 
conference held on July 28, 1986, the parties agreed to stipulate 
to the facts and "submit the issues on briefs". (R. 147) Each 
side did submit a trial memoranda, and thereafter Judge Fishier 
entered his minute order indicating that judgment should be 
entered for Dover Elevator. Plaintiff's attorney then submitted 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law which incorp-
orated the stipulated facts by reference and stated, in the 
proposed Conclusions of Law, "Plaintiff acted reasonably in 
retaining the services of an attorney . . . and is entitled to an 
award of reasonable attorney's fees. (Proposed Conclusion of Law 
No. 7, R. 396) Counsel for appellant filed objections to the 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 268-275) 
Thereafter, judgment (R. 410-413) was entered awarding 
Dover Elevator attorney fees against appellant, but without any 
findings as to the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency 
of the attorney representing Dover Elevator, the number of hours 
or the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case as 
against appellant, the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar services, or the expertise and experience of Dover's 
attorney. See, Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624-625 (Utah 
1985). The stipulated facts certainly contained no facts upon 
which a reasonable attorney fee could be awarded and the record 
is otherwise devoid of evidence that would justify an award of 
attorney's fees for Dover. The only affidavit of counsel for 
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Dover relating to attorney's fees specifically limits its 
application to attorney's fees incurred "in its claims against 
Hill-Mangum Investments, Brent C. Hill, and Russell W. Mangum". 
(R. 150-152) That affidavit was submitted to the trial court 
along with an order striking the pleadings of defendants Hill-
Mangum, Hill and Mangum. (R. 153-155) There is absolutely 
nothing in the file upon which this court could conclude that the 
award of attorney fees against appellant Garden Towers Condo-
Owners Corp. was for a reasonable amount. 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, supra, 694 P.2d.622, states as 
follows: 
"A party who is entitled to attorneys fees and costs 
and fails to ask for all of them in the trial phase of the 
case, or fails to adduce adequate evidence in support of a 
finding of reasonable attorneys fees, waives any right to 
claim those fees later. An award of attorneys fees must 
generally be made on the basis of findings of fact supported 
by the evidence and appropriate conclusions of law. 
(Citations) It is not consistent with judicial economy to 
allow a party to apply for additional fees for trial work, 
whether in an independent hearing, in a separate suit, or at 
a hearing to determine an award of attorneys fees for 
necessary appellate work. Once the matter is litigated, or 
could have been litigated, a party may not later come into 
court to seek an additional award. . . . 
On a number of occasions, we have held that attorneys 
fees should be awarded on the basis of evidence and that 
findings of fact should be made which support the award." 
(694 P.2d at 624-625) 
In the instant case, Dover Elevator made no attempt to 
present evidence as to what a reasonable attorney fee would be 
for work relating to its claim against appellant, either by 
affidavit or otherwise. Neither did Dover prepare or request 
from the court findings of fact relating to its attorney's fees 
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claim against appellant. Instead/ Dover's counsel merely 
prepared a judgment/ ultimately signed by the trial court/ which 
included $1,444.68 in attorney's fees. 
If the entire case is remanded for a new trial/ and 
Dover Elevator prevails, it can then be determined whether it is 
entitled to attorney's fees against appellant. Otherwise, this 
court should deem the claim to attorney's fees waived and should 
strike the award of attorney's fees included in the judgment. 
IV. 
THE STIPULATED FACTS PROVIDE NO BASIS UPON WHICH APPELLANT 
COULD BECOME OBLIGATED ON THE CONTRACT ENTERED 
BETWEEN DOVER ELEVATOR AND HILL-MANGUM 
The Maintenance Agreement between Dover Elevator and 
Hill-Mangum was dated March 1/ 1982. The contract was cancelled 
by Dover Elevator effective January 23/ 1984 for nonpayment. 
Appellant, the "association of unit owners" as that term is 
defined at U.C.A. § 57-8-3(1) [formerly at § 57-8-3(11)], was not 
formed until September 1, 1984. Thus, the agreement upon which 
Dover sought to hold appellant liable was cancelled, and all 
services under that agreement had been rendered, more than eight 
months prior to the beginning of appellant's legal existance. 
In the trial court Dover sought to justify this odd 
result by reference to the Declaration of Condominium filed by 
Hill-Mangum Investment as declarant and signed by Brent C. Hill 
and Russell W. Mangum. The Declaration does provide that "the 
business, property and affairs of the Project shall be managed, 
operated and maintained by the Board" [Declaration, Ull(a), R. 
240]. "Board" is defined in the Declaration as "the Board of 
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Direcotrs of the Association" [Declaration/ 112(c)] and 
"Association" refers to "Garden Towers Condominium Owners 
Association/ an unincorporated association and not. a legal 
entity" [Declaration, H2(b)]. (R. 235) The Declaration also 
provides that "until the first annual or organizational meeting 
of the Association as outlined in the accompanying By-Laws, the 
Board shall consist of the Declarant" [Declaration/ 1111(c)] . (R. 
241) 
Based on the argument that Hill-Mangum was appellant's 
board of directors at the time it entered into the maintenance 
agreement/ Dover concludes that the maintenance agreement was in 
fact between it and appellant. The conclusion is unwarranted by 
the Stipulated Facts or the documents included in the record. 
A. 
The Legal Conclusion Which Must Be Drawn Is That The 
Maintenance Agreement Was Not Signed By 
Hill-Mangum In Any Capacity Except Its Own 
The Dover Elevator Maintenance Agreement (R. 196-199) 
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was "accepted" by Gary Lawrence on behalf of Hill-Mangum. There 
is no indication on the face of the agreement that Hill-Mangum 
meant to enter into the agreement in the capacity of board of 
directors of the unformed owners1 association or any capacity 
except its own. Even if was Hill-Mangum1s unexpressed intent to 
enter into the Agreement in its capacity as board of directors of 
5. In fact/ the Maintenance Agreement was accepted by "Hill-
Mangum Inc." There was no such corporation (Stipulated Fact No. 
7, R. 177). The name refers to the partnership/ Hill-Mangum 
Investments/ which often used the abbreviation "Inv." for 
Investments. 
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the nonexistant owners1 association, and to bind the owners1 
association, the law is clear that it could not do so absent 
ratification by the owners1 association once it was formed. 
The Condominium Ownership Act is "additional and 
supplementary" to, but does not abrogate, common law. Brickyard 
Homeowners1 Ass'n v. Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 
1983). That being the case, the law relating to the liability of 
a corporation for contracts entered by a promoter provides an 
appropriate analogy. 
A contract with a corporation's promoter is not one 
with the corporation absent some subsequent corporate act or 
agreement. Jacobson v. Stern, 605 P.2d 198, 201 (Nev. 1980). 
Thus, absent a subsequent ratification, no liability will attach 
to a corporation for preincorporation contracts. Bishop v. 
Parker, 103 Utah 145, 134 P.2d 180, 181 (1943); Tanner v. Sinaloa 
Land & Fruit Co., 43 Utah 14, 134 P. 586 (1913). As stated in 
Tanner: 
"The great weight of authority . . . holds that parties 
who undertake to organize a corporation cannot bind the 
corporation by their contracts and agreements made before 
the company is incorporated. The authorities, however, 
practically all agree that a corporation may by corporate 
action adopt the contracts of its promoters . . .." 134 P. 
at 589. 
More recent cases in neighboring jurisdictions hold 
likewise. See, e.g., Ong Hing v. Arizona Harness Raceway, Inc., 
459 P.2d 107, 112 (Ariz.App. 1969); Peters Grazing Association v. 
Legerski, 544 P.2d 449, 454 (Wyo. 1976); and Eustis v. 
Park-O-Lator Corp., 435 P.2d 802, 805 (Or. 1967), reh'g denied, 
437 P.2d 734. 
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In the instant case there was no ratification of the 
Maintenance Agreement/ nor could there have been one. Not only 
was the Agreement terminated prior to appellant's existence. 
Stipulated Fact No. 25 (R. 181) establishes that appellant did 
not know of the Maintenance Agreement until served with Dover 
Elevator's lawsuit. Ratification of a preincorporation contract 
will not be presumed even where the corporation has received 
benefits from the contract, unless the corporaticn had actual 
knowledge of the specific contract out of which the benefits 
arose. Chapman v. Sky L'Onda Mut. Water Go./ 69 C.A.2d 667, 159 
P.2d 988, 992 (1945). 
The general rule discussed above—that until a 
corporation has come into being, it cannot contract as a 
corporation—applies "even though the contract be made in the 
corporation's name, and with the understanding that it would 
perform the same". Ong Hing v. Arizona Harness Raceway, Inc., 
supra, 459 P.2d 107, 112. In this case it is clear that the 
Maintenance Agreement was not made in the name of the owners1 
association which the declarant intended to be formed. Utah law 
is well settled that when a contract is signed by an individual 
personally, without indicating that he was an agent acting for a 
principal, he is personally bound by the contract signed in his 
individual capacity. Marveon Sign Company v. Roennebeck, 694 
P.2d 605 (Utah 1985); Anderson v. Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 
1982); Mortgage Investment Co. v. Toone, 17 Utah 2d 152, 406 P.2d 
30, 31 (1965). Under the facts of this case—appellant was not 
formed until after the contract was cancelled, appellant never 
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knew of the contract until served with summons/ and there having 
been no ratification of the contract and no evidence that any 
unit owner other than Hill-Mangum was a unit owner while Dover 
was performing under the Maintenance Agreement—the corollary of 
the rule should be that there can be no liability on the part of 
the corporation when no agency relationship is indicated by the 
contract signatory. 
As stated in Berman v. Gurwicz/ 458 A.2d 1311 (N.J. 
Super.Ch. 1981): 
"In a condominium setting the developer who controls 
the association at the beginning of the selling period knows 
that the purchasers of the condominium units will control 
the association eventually; the association is designed to 
be the representative of all unit owners for whom it will 
manage the common property elements and from whom it will 
collect revenues with which to meet common expenses. These 
future owners cannot be subjected to obligations undertaken 
by the association on their behalf without disclosure to 
them. Further, when disclosure has not been made to the 
unit owners, the association should not be saddled with 
unusual or unexpected liabilities until it is controlled by 
the unit owners and has had an opportunity to act 
independently with respect to them." (458 A.2d at 1316) 
In this case there is no evidence of an understanding 
by Dover Elevator that an owners1 association would eventually be 
created to take over the contract. There is not even evidence 
that Dover Elevator knew that Garden Towers was to be a 
condominium with an owners1 association. For all that appears, 
it was a completely fortuitous occurrence that by the time Dover 
Elevator brought suit a "deep pocket" existed upon whom it could 
attempt to shift liability for Hill-Mangum1s unpaid obligation. 
Since appellant, the owners1 association, received no benefit 
from the Maintenance Agreement, it should not be subjected to 
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obligations undertaken by the developer when it had no 
opportunity to act independently with respect to the Agreement. 
B. 
Hill-Mangum Did Not Conform With Requirements Of The 
Declaration And By-Laws When It Contracted With 
Dover Elevator/ And Dover Had No Grounds To 
Anticipate Or Rely On The Availability 
Of A Third-Party Obligor 
As discussed above/ the Maintenance Agreement was 
accepted by "Hill-Mangum Inc." and signed by Gary Lawrence/ Hill-
Mangum1 s Project Manager. There is no evidence to conclude that 
the Agreement was entered by Hill-Mangum in the capacity of 
director of the then nonexistent owners1 association. While it 
is true that "until the first . . . meeting of the Association . 
. . the Board shall consist of the Declarant" [Declaration/ 
1111(c)]/ the Declaration also provides as follows: 
"Any instrument executed by the Board that recites 
facts which/ if true, would establish the Board's power and 
authority to accomplish through such instrument what is 
purported to be accomplished thereby, shall conclusively 
establish said power and authority in favor of any person 
who in good faith and for value relies upon said 
instrument. " [Declaration/ 1111(a) ] 
Review of the Maintenance Agreement (R. 196-199) 
reveals no recitation of facts to create any inference that the 
Agreement was intended to bind any entity other than Hill-Mangum. 
Neither do the stipulated facts or any other document of record 
contain evidence by which it might be inferred that Dover 
Elevator relied in any way on the credit of any entity other than 
Hill-Mangum when it agreed to provide elevator maintenance 
service. 
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The Declaration further provides that the Board of 
Directors has "the authority to enter into contracts which in any 
way concern the Project/ so long as any vote or consent of the 
Unit Owners necessitated by the subject matter of the agreement 
has been obtained". [Declaration, 1111(a)(3)] Paragraph 14 of the 
Declaration states, in part: "No assessment for a single 
improvement in the nature of a capital expenditure which exceeds 
the sum of $100.00 shall be made without the same having been 
first voted on and approved by a majority of the Unit Owners." 
The Maintenance Agreement obligates the person or entity with 
whom Dover was contracting to pay $470.00 per month (R. 198), yet 
no evidence exists to justify a conclusion that consent to enter 
the Agreement was obtained by the unit owners. 
Finally, The By-Laws of the Association of Owners 
provides that all contracts "shall be signed by such person or 
persons as shall be provided by general or special resolution of 
the Board, and in the absence of any such resolution . . . shall 
be signed by the President or the Vice President and by the 
Treasurer or Secretary". [By-Laws, Art. VI] Even assuming an 
unexpressed intent by Hill-Mangum to enter into the Maintenance 
Agreement in its capacity as preformation director of the owners1 
association, no evidence exists to justify a conclusion by the 
trial court that a resolution was passed by which Michael 
Lawrence was authorized to sign a contract to bind the owners1 
association. 
"A condominium association may exercise its powers only 
within the constraints of its condominium declaration and bylaws. 
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Lion Square Phase II and III v. Hask, 700 P.2d 932/ 934 (Colo. 
App. 1985)• If Dover Elevator in fact believed that an unformed 
owners1 association was eventually going to assume the 
obligations of the Maintenance Agreement/ it could and should 
have taken steps to see, first/ that the Agreement reflected the 
representative capacity of Hill-Mangum and, second/ that Hill-
Mangum was entering into the Agreement in a manner authorized by 
the Condominium Declaration and By-Laws. Since there is no 
evidence of an intent on the part of Dover to look to anyone but 
Hill-Mangum for payment of its charges, and because there is no 
evidence that appellant benefited from Dover's services, it is 
not at all unjust to limit Dover to an action against the entity 
with whom it contracted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-16.5(3) does not mandate any 
conclusion contrary to those expressed above. The provisions of 
Section 57-8-16.5 "shall be strictly construed tc protect the 
rights of the unit owners". U.C.A. § 57-8-16.5(4). In view of 
Hill-Mangum1s failure to follow the Declaration and Bylaws it 
filed/ and Dover Elevator!s failure to assure itself of the 
existance of a third-party obligor, this court should conclude 
that Section 57-8-16.5(3) has no application because the 
declarant failed to act in conformity with its Declaration and 
Bylaws. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant Garden Towers Condo-Owners Corportion 
respectfully submits that for the reasons discussed in part IV of 
its Argument/ the judgment entered by the trial court should be 
reversed and judgment entered in favor of appellant and against 
plaintiff Dover Elevator. The facts before the trial court did 
not justify a conclusion that Hill-Mangum Investments was acting 
as appellant's agent when it entered into the Dover Elevator 
Maintenance Agreement. 
Alternatively/ for the reasons discussed in parts 1/ II 
and III of the Argument/ the judgment should be reversed and the 
case should be remanded for/ in essence/ a new trial; the trial 
court should be directed to consider the stipulated facts and law 
and enter its own considered Conclusions of Law based on those 
facts. If the parties or the trial court believe further factual 
determinations are necessary an evidentiary hearing can be held 
to resolve factual issues not covered in the stipulated facts. 
In any event/ the award of attorney's fees to Dover 
Elevator should be reversed for the reasons set forth in part III 
of appellant's Argument. 
Appellant should be awarded its costs on appeal. 
Dated this 7fl day of July, 1987. 
BEASLIN/ NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
By /h" fr 14^ t-rfi'i.l <f-
Steven H.^Lybbert 
Bruce E. Coke 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Garden Towers Condo-Owners 
Corporation 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Stipulation of Facts 
B. Master Maintenance Agreement 
C. Minute Entry 
D. Judgment 
E. E x c e r p t s From Garden Towers Condominium Owners A s s o c i a t i o n 
By-Laws and C.C.&R. [ D e c l a r a t i o n of Condominium] 
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^ r^ viv^ nclO/i-zs-
J o h n D. P a r k e n ( 2 5 1 8 ) 
M a r c e l l a L. Keck ( 4 0 6 3 ) 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
S u i t e 1330 
310 S o u t h Main S t r e e t 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U tah 8 4 1 0 1 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 1 - 6 3 8 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
DOVER ELEVATOR COMPANY, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
HILL-MANGUM INVESTMENTS, 
RUSSELL W. MANGUM, BRENT 
C. HILL and GARDEN TOWERS 
CONDO-OWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
C i v i l N o . C 8 5 - 1 4 2 
The H o n o r a b l e P h i l i p R. 
F i s h i e r 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
oooOooo 
P l a i n t i f f D o v e r E l e v a t o r Company , by and t h r o u g h i t s 
c o u n s e l , J o h n D. P a r k e n , a n d D e f e n d a n t G a r d e n T o w e r s C o n d o - O w n e r s 
C o r p o r a t i o n , by and t h r o u g h i t s c o u n s e l , B r u c e E. C o k e , h e r e b y 
s t i p u l a t e , f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h i s a c t i o n , t o t h e f o l l o w i n g 
f a c t s . The l e g a l a r g u m e n t s and c o n t e n t i o n s o f t h e p a r t i e s a p p e a r 
e l s e w h e r e . 
1 . S o m e t i m e d u r i n g l a t e 1979 and e a r l y 1 9 8 0 , a p a r t -
n e r s h i p c o n s i s t i n g o f B r e n t C. H i l l and R u s s e l l W. Mangum, known 
a s H i l l - M a n g u m I n v e s t m e n t s Company , e m b a r k e d on t h e p r o j e c t o f 
c o n s t r u c t i o n and e r e c t i n g a m u l t i - s t o r i e d c o n d o m i n i u m known a s 
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Garden Towers. The s t a r t i n g or completion dates of the construc-
t ion are not precise ly known and are not important. 
2. On or about August 27, 1980, pr ior to the adoption 
of the Covenants, Conditions and R e s t r i c t i o n s , a contract was 
entered into between Hill-Mangum Investments (although in the 
documents themselves i t appears as Hill Mangum, Inc.) as the 
purchaser, and Dover Elevator as s e l l e r . That cont rac t i s signed 
(although the s ignature i s d i f f i c u l t to read) by Gary Lawrence, 
Hill-Mangum1s project manager. A copy of t h a t agreement i s 
attached as Exhibit "A." 
3. In addi t ion to the cont rac t i t s e l f the re were th ree 
change o rders , copies of which are attached as Exhibits "B," "C,ff 
and "D." 
4. Pursuant to the const ruct ion c o n t r a c t , Hill-Mangum 
and i t s const ruct ion lender made payments t o t a l i n g $140,452.00, 
as itemized in the schedule annexed hereto as Exhibit "E." 
5. Covenants, Conditions, and Res t r i c t ions were signed 
by the Declarant, Hill-Mangum, on August 12, 1981. A copy of 
these Covenants, Conditions, and R e s t r i c t i o n s , and the accom-
panying Bylaws, have been submitted to the Court, as Exhibit "4" 
to Defendant Garden Towers Condo-Owners Corporat ion 's Trial Memo-
randum. These documents were recorded December 15, 1981. 
6. On March 1, 1982, a fur ther agreement dealing with 
maintenance of the e leva tor to be i n s t a l l e d was executed and a l so 
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s u b s c r i b e d by Gary L a w r ^ n c ^ •>" t - . ^ . - j ! * . • wi ; Mar:; :*" " r i c . A 
< ,* l a c t i c -i n e r <• * i • a - :; . : , a nd i s 
d a t e d F e b r u a r y 10 . l'.M':_. J I t h o i i ^ i t h e s i g n a t u r e o f Hover i s d a t e d 
March 2 , 1 9 8 2 . 
7 T h e r e was no s u c h c o r p o r a t i o n a s " H i ! 1 - M a n g u m , 
In< : . , " d u r . • . M ^ r p i ^ a n ? M m e s . T h a t name r e f e r s to i u n -
Mangi lm In y ! 
c •- . M: r r f e i r. e v i l d a y s . I t was u n a b ] e , b y 
r e a so n of i a c k of f und s a nd • r M * p r ob ] ems t : z om ]::: 1 e t e 11: i e 
p r o j e c t anH mnnv t h i n g s WPT*- _ - . i u n d o n e . Par* . ^ *-a-' ^ ""he 
c o n s t r u c t i o n v > s r s o f t h e b- i j - i - i in^ went u n p a i * n r/i • ^ : i i , a a ut a 
n i ill b e i :> f i t e in s r em a :i n i In c oi n p 1 e I: e ell f i r s t 
m o r t g a g e a l s o f e l l on e v i l d a y s and i s • * r **e h a n d s - * * ne 
FDIC. The m o r t g a g e i s b e i n g f o r e c l o s e d and ha ' • 
y e a r s . 
9 }- M;r , i a h n n d o n o d t ! P - i>r<, H- r and th*-- o < ^ n -
p a r r -. . . ' -
s o l . 4 " : .!i i ; >> i t ma . 5 M r c •v ;.• r - : wa 1 1 - . K 
Mangum h o i . K t i t l e * * h< in : r ^
 r o u r ' t h - u n i ^ * - > - -
b ^ < • • » . . - i 
owned * v < : . j U a x ^ * 
1 . . . . . . - M ' ^ M ned t h e e l e v a t >rs in t h e Ciardeti 
T • 11 Il 9 8 2 I .h rougl i J a n u a r y 2::l, 19 8 4 , 
when t h e <•; - • * -A - *i<, a n c e ! l e d d u e t o n o n - p a y m e n t . 
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11, In accordance with the terms of the maintenance 
con t rac t , e f fec t ive March 1, 1983, the monthly payment due under 
the maintenance contract was increased to $505.25 per month. A 
copy of the notice effecting t h i s increase i s annexed hereto as 
Exhibit MG." 
11. Hill-Mangum paid the monthly maintenance charges 
through and including the month of November, 1982, although these 
payments were not made on time. 
12. Hill-Mangum paid the December, 1982, and the 
January, February, and March, 1983, service fees by means of a 
check drawn on the Firs t Security Bank of Utah paya.ble to Dover 
Elevator. This check, in the t o t a l amount of $6,950.00, was 
d i rec ted by Hill-Mangum to be applied to the $5,303.00 balance 
due on the construct ion contrac t and the remainder on the main-
tenance cont rac t as described. A true and co r r ec t copy of t h i s 
check i s annexed hereto as Exhibit "R." 
13. The check described in the preceding paragraph was 
dated April 29, 1983, and was received by Dover within a few 
weeks a f te r that da te , and was credi ted as d i r ec t ed by H i l l -
Mangum on May 27, 1983. Later , Dover Elevator was contacted by 
the const ruct ion lender on the Arlington Place projec t (which was 
a lso known as University Place) and compelled to c r e d i t t h i s 
check to tha t project in accordance with the wr i t t en d i r ec t ion 
appearing on the face of the check. Accordingly, on February 15, 
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1984, the c r e d i t p r e v i o u s ! y i SSU«-MI .^: *»l0 m a i n t e n a n c e c o n t r a c t 
foi ' December, • * January - t e r n a r y , and 
March, 1983, was r e v e r s e d . 
• 1 4 . T h e >t • • * • • 
payments on. t h e s e r v i o ^ c o n t r a c t were mad*- >' ^h^r 1* - iu-u inj. tr--
nam** nrrardf-r Towers Condominiilm Owners A s s o c i a t i e - ^ .i ^ere 
S I - ' ' . - • i : e 
a t t a c h e d a s l x h i o ; ' »ese checks were ~ ? rpr» i \ ^ : in a 
t i m e l y f a s h i o n but were accepted t ' •> 
15. As noted abov^ + h* ma; •• * -»ia:i( - ••on*.a^ ,+ wis " ir 
c e l l e d by Dover E l e v a t o r e f f e c t i v e Januarv '?? 19,94, 
'16 . • The oi i t s ta fid . e 
maintenance c o n t r a c t are i t emized in the s c h e d u l e annexed h e r e t o 
as Exhib i t " J." 
1 . , ••••... Mangum entered 
.into an agreemen' * * * satrf- Heva*. - * -r * •- maintenance e ? 
the passenger elevator*- ,ne baraen i'ow*r-
T * r*a • larden Towerq tone ASS- . - x»-
"purchaser ' e eon* T -tc * wa s sipae^ n hen a t >^ t ' 
chaser ; . * . . - "*.: 
p , - . • "riu , . ur. old un its, - ^ 
and i . o r r e c t n>p> of t h i s agreement i s annexed h e r e t o as E x h i b i t 
18 . I ii De c em b ei :> I: ] { ) 8 3 o n t a c t« e 
unit owners of Garden Towers, suggesting that they hold a n 
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owners1 meeting in January of 1984 to e lec t o f f icers and, 
genera l ly , to take over operat ion of the condominium owners1 
as soc ia t ion . Until t h i s t ime, there had been no meetings between 
Hill-Mangum and the individual uni t owners nor any meeting of the 
owners' a s soc ia t ion . 
19. On December 16, 1983, the unit owners wrote back 
to Hill-Mangum, decl ining to accept "control and management" of 
the project un t i l a number of enumerated items had been com- **j 
4 A/0 ACCaJQL/*9A/6**0W*&1> ^ ^ 
ple tedi A copy of t h i s l e t t e r i s annexed hereto as Exhibit "L." 
20. No accounting whatsoever was furnished to the unit 
owners, although each un i t owner, as they purchased the i r unit 
i n t e r e s t , had to pay t h e i r monthly condominium assessment, as 
determined by Hill-Mangum. No meetings were held to discuss the 
charges imposed. 
21. Subsequently, the e l e c t r i c power to the building 
was terminated and the un i t owners determined that they would 
have to assume the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of keeping the building 
ope ra t i ve . 
22. On September 1, 1984, the unit owners, a f te r 
n o t i c e , met to form a corporat ion to manage the bui ld ing . As a 
consequence of t ha t meeting, a corporat ion was formed known as 
"Garden Towers Condo-Owners Corporation." Officers and d i r ec to r s 
were elected and the corporat ion undertook the ac t ive management 
of the common areas of the bu i ld ing . A t rue and cor rec t copy of 
6 
t h e A r t i c l e s o f I n c o r p o r a t i o n f i l e d by Uie c o r p o r a t i o n a r e a n -
nex ed h e r e t o a s Exh i b 1 1 " ?I " 
2 3 , Hi l l -Mangum h a s f a i l e d t o p ay t h e f e e s a s s e s s e d 
a g a i n s t i t s \ IF l i t s and t h e uni I o w n e r s \\i\we e l e c t e e • ^e 
Hi l l -Mangum f o r t h e d e l i n q u e n t c h a r g e s . The r e m a i n i n g u-
owners have r e m a i n e d e s s e n t i a l l y c u r r e n t i n t h e i r c^ndomim urn f e e 
pa y m e n t s . 
'
 :
 •• about O c t o b e r 1 5 , 1 9 8 4 , Garden Tower- ("ondo-
Owner s L o " ' : >i 1 1 1 a c t w i !:, h Wa sa t c I: i El 
r e p l a c i n g the e a r l i e r <• t ra s i g n e d ! :>y lw<: • >x. 
2 5 , The o f f i c e r s o f Garden Towers Condo-Owners 
C o r p < ) r n J i o n w> r e in '« i a wa r e , u n t i l I h i s n i l i n n wa s s r r v e d , n I I h e 
M a i n t e n a n c e C o n t r a c t w i t h Dover E l e v a t o r , w! i f:a i ^ e e n r e p l a c e d 
by t h e Wasa t ch E l e v a t o r c o n t r a c t by t h e t i m e t n e * - s 
f o r m e d . 
BRUCE E. COKE 
C o u n s e l f o r D e f e n d a n t Garden 
Towers Condo-Owners C o r p o r a t i o n 
Date At/if Z9. /f&* 
7 
1 8 1 
OJ>^J- r^i^s 
IVI/Air5TER 
Maintenance <=jfc l e r 
DOVER ELEVATOR COMPANY 
SUBSID IARY OF DOVER CORPORATION 
FOR COMPLETE ELEVATOR EQUIPMENT PROTECTION 
DOVER MASTER MAINTENANCE SERVICE will be provided for the following described elevator(s) tWO p a s s e n g e r e l e v a t O r S 
and bearing serial number(s) C - 3 2 7 1 7 - 1 8 
In your building located at 1 4 1 - 2 n d A v e n u e 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dover will maintain the entire elevator equipment as hereinafter described, on the terms and conditions subseqijently set forth. We will use factory tr, 
men directly employed and supervised by us. They will be qualified to keep your equipment properly adjusted, and Ihey will use all reasonable CJ 
maintain the elevator equipment in proper operating condition. 
We will regularly and systematically examine, adjust, lubricate as required, and. if conditions warrant, repair or i eplace: 
MACHINE. MOTOR. GENERATOR AND CONTROLLER PARTS 
Including worms, gears, bearings, brake magnet coils, or brake motors, brake shoes, brushes, windings, commutators, 
rotating elements, contacts, coils, resistance for operating and motor circuits, solid stale control components, magnet 
frames and other mechanical and electrical parts-using only genuine standard interchangeable paits for this purpose, similar 
or comparable to the original parts installed. 
DOVER ALSO AGREES: 
To keep the guide rails properly lubricated at all times, except where roller guides are used, and when necessary to renew guide shoe gibs, or 
rollers when used, to insure smooth and quiet operation. 
To equalize periodically the tension on all hoisting ropes. 
To renew ail wire ropes as often as necessary to maintain an adequate factor of safety, and repair and/or replace conductor cables. 
To furnish lubricants which are specially prepared and compounded. 
To make any adjustments, repairs, and replacements which it may be advisable to make before the next regular examination. 
To make a governor and safety test, at our discretion and expense, on each elevator covered under this proposal. We assume no responsibility for the 
tion of the governor or safety, under the terms of this proposal, until this test has been made. Should the governor or safety not meet safety requirements, 
be the responsibility of the owner to make the necessary repairs and to place said equipment in condition wh»ch will be acceptable for coverage unc 
terms of this agreement We shall not be liable for damage to equipment or building structure resulting from triis test, except where a valid test ha! 
successfully made by us during a twelve month period preceding the effective date of agreement. 
To examine, lubricate, adjust, and if conditions warrant, repair or replace ail accessory equipment, with exceptions as stated hereinafter. 
The following items of elevator equipment are not included in this agreement Refinishing. repairing or replacement of car enclosure, car doors. h< 
enclosure, hoistway door panels, frames and sills, car flooring and floor covering, light fixtures and lamps, main line power switches, breakers and 
to controller, emergency power plant and associated contactors, emergency car light and battery, smoke and fire sensors with related control eqi 
not specifically part of elevator controls. 
The items listed on the schedule below show considerable wear and will have to be replaced in the near future. To provide you with the maximum of 
from these items, we are accepting them in their present condition with the understanding that you agree tc pay. in addition to the base amoun 
proposal, an extra at the time the items listed are first replaced. The charge for this replacement will be determined by pro-rating the total cost of r< 
the individual items. You agree to pay for that portion of the life of the items used prior to the date of this contract, and we agree to pay for that porti 
since the date of this contract. 
SCHEDULE OF PARTS TO BE PRO-RATED 
NAME OF PART INSTAU 
IM DC 26-0 1-T 197 
1 he Purchaser agrees to report immediately any condition which may indicate the need for correction before the next regular examination. 
You agree to accep t ou r ju dgm e n t; a s to t h e m ea n i. a n d m eI h od s to be • m p I o y e d f o r a n y c o r r e c "I i v e w o r k u i »de r c o n $ i ci eralion 
All work is to be performed during regular working houi i of our regular working days unless otherwise specified below. 
Regular time •callbacks are included in this contract but are confined to emergency minor adjustments deemed necessary between regularly 
scheduled inspections. 
If ovef time work, not included ii this contract is requested by tl it Pui chaser covering examinations repairs or emergency callback service, 
you agree to pay us for the difference between regular and overtime labor at our usual billing rates unless otherwise specified under "special 
conditions." 
Tlhii service will be furnished from McirCn I S t 19 BZ. i t the price herein named, and will continue until termination 
•s provided herein. Either party may terminate this agreement either at the end of five (5) years, or at the end of any subsequent yeer by giving 
the other party sixty (60) days prior written notice. 
Th.pricof«*s*vic«hminmoitaiib. Fourhundred and seventy dollars 
„ Dollars, ($ 4 7 0 » 0 0 _, ) ptt month, payable monthly in advance, upon presentation of invoice. 
The contract price shall be adjusted annually as of the anniversary date the service commences, based on the percentage of increase or 
decrease in the straight time hourly labor cost for elevator examiners in the locality where the equipment is to be examined. For purposes of 
this agreement, straight time hourly labor cost shall mean the straight time hourly rate paid to elevator examiners plus fringe benefits and 
union welfare granted in lieu of, or in addition to, hourly rate increases. Fringe benefits include, but are not limited to, pensions, vacations, 
paid holidays, group life insurance, sickness and accident insurance, and hospitalization insurance. The straight time hourly labor cost applic-
able to this contract is $ 1 8 . 9 9 of which $ 4 * 9 constitutes fringe benefits. 
S< 
The adjustments, repairs or replacements to be made will be such as are disclosed to be reasonably necessary by the 
examination. We shall not be required to make repairs or renewals necessitated by negligence or misuse of the machinery, 
equipment or car, or due to any other cause beyond our control except ordinary wear. We shall not be required to install 
new attachments or devices on the equipment as directed or recommended by insurance companies or by government, 
state, municipal or other authorities or perform any other work not specifically set forth in this contract 
It is understood, in consideration of our performance of the service enumerated herein at the price stated, that nothing in 
this agreement shall be construed to mean that Dover Elevator Company assumes any liability on account of accidents to 
persons or property except those directly due to negligent acts of Dover Elevator Company or its employees, and that the 
Purchaser's own responsibility for accidents to persons or properties while riding on or being on or about the aforesaid 
equipment referred to, is in no way affected by this agreement. Dover Elevator Company shall not be held responsible or 
liable for any loss, damage, detention, or delay caused by accidents, labor troubles, strikes, lockouts, fire, flood, acts of 
civil or military authorities, or by insurrection or riot, or by any other cause which is unavoidable or beyond its control, 
or in any event for consequential damages. No work, service or liability on the part of Dover Elevator Company, other than 
that specifically mentioned herein, is included or intended. It is agreed that Dover Elevator Company does not assume 
possession or control of any pari of the equipment as set forth herein but remains yours exclusively as the owner or leasee. 
Purchaser shall pay as an addition to the price stated, a sum equal to the amount of any taxes which may now or hereafter 
be exacted from purchaser or seller on account thereof. 
In the event of any change in ownership, lessor, lessee or management of the premises to a party other than the purchaser 
to this agreement, purchaser to this agreement must notify Dover Elevator Co. at least sixty (60) days prior to such 
change; otherwise, this agreement will in no way be affected by such change and the purchaser shall continue to be bound 
by the terms and conditions herein. 
In the event of any default of the payment provisions herein, purchaser agrees to pay, in addition to any defaulted amount, 
all attorney fees, collection cost or court cost in connection therewith. 
Dover Elevator Company reserves the right to discontinue this contract at any time by notification in writing should pay-
menu not be made in accordance with the terms of this agreement. 
m,s 
In the event the Purchaser's acceptance is in the form of a purchase order or other kind of document, the provisions, terms 
and conditions of this proposal shall govern in the event of conflict. 
No agent or employee shall have the authority to waive or modify any of the terms of this contract. 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS: 
Your acceptance of this agreement, and its approval by an executive officer of Dover Elevator Company, will constitute exclusively ar 
entirely the agreement for the service herein described. All prior representations or agreements, whether written or verbal, not incorporati 
herein are superseded, and no changes in or additions to this agreement will be recognized unless made in writing and signed by both parti* 
This proposal and contract is hereby accepted: 
ACCEPTED: 
Hill Mangum Inc. 
133 - 1st Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
D O V E R ELEVATOR COMPANY 
OFFICE AT
 1 1 4 6 Richards Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
PURCHASER 
fea./Oi !<&?-
luirre, Sales Representati 
S ^--T3>TE Fphmary ,3-Oth 1 
Kenneth L Hodge , . 
TtTir Asst Treasurer DATE ?A'U^ 
1S9 
vxjuniy OT salt Lake - State of Utah 
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LE: (^ PARTIES PRESENT) 
ill^/L/,y, jLinYt CmJ do 
KkJA - Hryi^n ^a^x^ U/)u,u^t, 
' 0 
^ 6 6 flJ 
m 
• ' • W ' . 
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John D. Parken (2518) 
Karcella L. Ksck (4063) 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
Suite 1330 
310 South Main S t r e e t 
Sal t Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
X ^£P 1ELCLERKS OrFICG 
Salt 
L'L 
IN THE DISTRICT COUP THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—-oooOooo—— 
DOVER ELEVATOR COMPANY, 
Plaintiff , 
V. 
HILL-MANGUM INVESTMENTS, 
RUSSELL W. MAN6UM, BRENT C. 
BILL, and GARDEN TOWERS CONDO 
OWNERS CORPORATION, 
Defendant <i. 
JUDGMENT 
\ • h, 
Civil No. C85-142 3 ) 
: The Honorable Michael 
Murphy 
• —oooOooo—- Uj&l * 
The above-entitled matter cam regul* 
ne Stipulation of Plaintiff and Defendant 
Garden Towers Condo-Owners Corporation as to the facts of 
case; Plaintiff having been repi eiiHiitml \w M M
 CO|lnsei# John D. 
Parlcen; Defendant Garden Towers Condo-Owners Corporation having 
been represented by its counsel, Bruce Coke? the defai.ni il 
Defendantj. IllII Hangum investments, Russell W. Mangum, and Brent 
C. Hill having been entered by the Court; the Court (the 
Honorable Philip 1i " I v l«i" «"1 \i ">: eiF!<>,! Lng) having reviewed the 
written Stipulation of the parties and the arguments of the 
parties as contained in their respective Memoranda and having 
taken the matter under advisement, and having (entered a Minute 
Entry in favor of Plaintiff; the Honorable Michael Murphy having 
now been appointed to succeed Judge Fishier and having heard the 
arguments of counsel on Defendant Garden Towers's objection to 
the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav and having 
ruled that no Findings or Conclusions will be filed; Defendant 
Garden Towers having objected to the inclusion of an award of 
counsel fees; the Court having held a telephone conference with 
counsel and having ruled that counsel fees shall be awarded in a 
specific amount for all fees incurred through December 12, 1986, 
and the Court having directed counsel to confer with'regard to 
the amount of fees to be awarded and to notice up a further 
hearing if they could not agree to an amount; and the Court being 
now fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing 
therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that. Plaintiff shall 
have and recover judgment against Defendant Garden Towers Condo-
Owners Corporation in the principal amount of $3,664.37, together 
with prejudgment interest at the rate of ten (10) per cent per 
annum in the amount of $1,285.99, for a total of $4,950.36, 
together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve (12) per 
cant per annum from and after the date hereof and together also 
with Plaintiff's costs, and counsel amount of 
01,444.68, representing the fees incurred through and including 
Friday, December , with additional fees, ncurred 
by determined upon later appropriate proceedings; 
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that this judgment against Defendant 
shall be deemed to ^ligation with that 
portion of the judgment heretofore entered in this action against 
Defendants Hill-Mangum Investments, Russell W. Mangum, &ud bt ei\l 
' i " 
• . ' I 
t Hi I > < minia tes elevator service contract as 
\ 
distinguished from the construction contract for the purchase and 
installation > : f tfc : E ^ Blevatoi : i • ,„ ingly# any amounts paid on 
the prior judgment against Defendants Hill-Mangum Investments, 
Russell Mangum, and Brent C. Hill in exce* 
(represent balance due on the construction contract of 
$5,300.74 and prejudgment interest thereon in the amount 
$1,855.26) plus accruij amount
 froffi thQ date of 
that judgment, shall be deemed a credit toward the satisfaction 
of the judgment now entered against Defendant Garden Tovexs 
Condo-Ovners Corporation. 
cft-
DATED this {* day of December, 1986. 
BY/THE' COURT: 
J/JOUMJL / . 
/ f l ^ • M s t r i c t J 
• Bruce E. Coke 
Attorney for Defendant 
Garden Towers Condo-
Ovners Corporation 
Di  udge 
3TATEOFUTAH ) — 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) * " 
I. THE UNOERS!oV"0. CLERK OF THE ! 
COtWT OF SALT i •- - fOUf lY. UTAH. DO HEREBY 
C3TTIFY THAT T *• "•-'.*!: .'-' -• ?CRSQOING « 
A TRUE ANO FlR.t CF / \ • * f-:s»AL DOO, 
V * f * N FILS !N 
u)nn\ 
•Tltii 
t iXONH<NDLE Cj iax: 
tAs. 3AiDCQLmT 
£A^_ OEPun 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
» * * -I hereby certify that on the /•/ day of December, 1986, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, to Bruce E. Coke, Esq., Beaslin^ 
Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, 333 North 300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84103. 
A Efflfom^ M *^£spr\*+** 
OF 
GARDEN TOWERS ' "^  r 
A CONDOMINIUM PROJECT 
1 Management. 
Authority of Board of Directors, The business, pro-
perty and affairs of the Project shall be managed/ operated 
and maintained by the Board, which shall consist of not less 
than five Unit Owners, as agent for the Unit Owners. The 
Board shall have, and is hereby granted, the following 
authority and powers: 
' 1 ) The authority, wi thout 11 ie vote or consent of 
the Unit Owners or of any other person(s), to grant or 
create, on such terms as it deems advisable, utility and 
similar easements, over, under, across and through the 
Common Areas and Facilities; and work performed pursuant 
to such easements must be done in a workmanlike manner 
ana any damage to the interior structure or decor of a 
Un;" m\,-it he repaired; •. 
^/ ^ne authority to execute and record, on behalf 
of all Unit Owners, any amendment to the Declaration or 
Map which has been approved by the vote or consent 
necessary to authorize such amendment; 
The authority to enter into contracts which ;i 
airy wa^ concern the Project, so long as any vote or con-
sent of i Unit. Owners necessitated by the subject 
matter of the agreement has been obtai ned; 
The power and authority to convey or transfer 
any interest in real property, so long as any vote o: 
consent necessary under the circumstances has been 
obtained; 
ID; The power and authority to purchase, otherwise 
acquire, and accept title to, any interest in real pro-
perty, so long as such action has been authorized by any 
vote or consent which is necessary under the circumstan-
ces, 
(6) The power and authority to add any interest in 
real property so long as such action has been authorized 
b -1 necessary vote or consent; 
(7) The authority to promulgate such reasonable 
rules, regulations, and procedures as may be necessary or 
desirable to aid the Manager in carrying out any of its 
functions or to insure that the project is maintained and 
used in a manner consistent with the interests of the 
Unit Owners; and 
(8) The power and authority to perform any other 
acts and to enter into any other transactions which may 
be reasonably necessary for the Manager to perform its 
functions as agent for the Unit Owners. 
Any instrument executed by the Board that recites facts 
which, if true, would establish the Board's power and authority to 
accomplish through such instrument what is purported to be 
accomplished thereby, shall conclusively establish said power and 
authority in favor of any person who in good faith and for value 
relies upon said instrument. 
(b) Manager. The Board shall employ for the Association 
a manager, at a compensation established by the Board to per-
form such duties and services as the Board shall authorize 
including, but not limited to, the duties listed in Section 
11(a). The duties conferred upon the Manager by the Board 
may at any time be resolved, modified or amplified by the 
majority of the Unit Owners, at a duly constituted meeting. 
(c) Designation of Board. The Board shall be elected by 
a majority vote of the Unit Owners. Until the first annual 
or organizational meeting of the Association as outlined in 
the accompanying By-Laws, the Board shall consist of the 
Declarant. 
14. Assessments. Every Unit Owner shall pay his propor-
tionate share of the common expenses. Payment thereof shall be in 
such amounts and at such times as the Manager determines in accor-
dance with the Act, the Declaration or the By-Laws. There shall 
be a lien for nonpayment of common expenses as provided by the 
Act. 
No assessment for a single improvement in the nature of a 
capital expenditure which exceeds the sum of $100.00 shall be made 
without the same having been first voted on and approved by a 
majority of the Unit Owners. 
BYLAWS OF 
THE ASSOCIATION OF OWNERS OF 
GARDEN TOWERS CONDOMINIUM 
ARTICLE VI 
Execution of Instruments 
1. Instruments Generally. All checks, drafts, notes, bonds, 
acceptances, contracts, and all other instruments, except con-
veyances shall be signed by such person or persons as shall be 
provided by general or special resulution of the Board, and in the 
absence of any such resolution applicable thereto such instrument 
shall be signed by the President or the Vice President and by the 
Treasurer or Secretary. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 9th day of July, 1987, I hand 
delivered four (4) copies of the foregoing Opening Brief Of 
Appellant to John D. Parken, Esq., Parken & Keck, attorneys for 
Respondent/ at Suite 808 Boston Buildinq, Salt Lake City* Utah. 
Steven H. Lybbert 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
